

But I don't see what the basis

under what aspects of the J.F.R. - 7.1

policy statement to facilitate planning?

1. The J.F.R. indicates that to get the message

Why do they need it? What points?

2. Promote the authors

3. But intra-service problems to focus attention to

suggest careful direction, working

4. How do we interpret the P.V.P. best plans?

11 from 1962 120 copies

2. Even though the NSC has not formally approved a new NSC, there have been significant changes in national level strategic thinking. These changes primarily deal with increased emphasis on our non-nuclear posture and a flexible and selective response, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to the entire spectrum of the Communist Threat.

3. Purpose of NSC is to:

a. Translate national objectives and policies of the US into terms of military objectives, strategic concepts, & tasks which are in consonance with actual US military capabilities.

b. Constitute a directive to CINCPAC for the conduct of ops in cold, CW & GW.

c. Present strategic & logistic planning guidance.

See Annex C, & (C/F), and

4.0 C2C

2. In order to ensure that military force is applied effectively, national authority will be delegated to the commander(s) responsible for the carrying out of ops.

6. Unified and specified commanders will conduct operations; the JCS will provide strategic guidance and ensure the timely organization and support of forces engaged.

C. Employment of nuclear weapons in CW will be subject to a greater degree of control than would be the case in GW.

GW Posture

16.2. Survivable Command, Communications & Information

1. reporting system to permit controlled, coordinated and informed direction of US forces & combined ops.

32. CW Nuclear Weapons Policy. The decision to use nuclear weapons will be made by the President in will

reflect the intent of the JCS to (1) Make every possible effort to keep the war at a non-nuclear level, but be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required. (2) Meet nuclear aggression

In the US will, at the time nuclear weapons are authorized for use by the President, provide additional guidance, as required.

33. Nuclear weapons will be employed:

1) If they are used against US and Allied forces.

2) If their use is necessary to maintain the tactical integrity of the forces engaged, or

3) If a deliberate political decision is made to

commit, by demonstrating our will and ability to employ nuclear weapons, if necessary.

(See Continuation of Rules of Engagement)

with appropriate nuclear response. (1) That

non-nuclear attacks will receive non-nuclear response unless

until US interests cannot be defended if the

non-nuclear level

✓ initiate a nuclear attack against the homeland of the other nation or one of its major allies.

2. (a) plans should envisage both massive and prolonged nuclear attacks. (b) partial implementation, either to support the defense against the same enemy, or due to imminent threat of planned reinforcements.

3. It is recognized that, during the period of hostilities, engagements between forces of the US and the USSR may occur which, in themselves, are not of such nature as to constitute sufficient cause for the US to implement GW plans. The circumstances, location and number of elements under which an engagement occurs would be major factors in determining what our national response might be. It is not possible to determine in advance the precise parameters of possible engagements under which the US would:

- 1) initiate at least temporary military disengagement, and thereby
- 2) engage the Soviet in lesser actions locally, presenting them with the alternatives of disengagement or escalation

3. It is recognized that, during the period of hostilities, engagements between forces of the US and the USSR may occur which, in themselves, are not of such nature as to constitute sufficient cause for the US to implement GW plans.

2.5. Central Nuclear 9/10

2. The US, under conditions of general war, will launch a nuclear strategic attack, in accordance with the NSOP, against disaggregated elements of F.S. power strengths.

[When? NSOP: 5th ^{ONSET} onset of GW probably will be characterized by the delivery of intensive nuclear blows by both sides.] [... NSOP: During initial phase.]

3. Flexibility. The NSOP must be adaptable if tactical conditions under it reasonably foreseeable conditions.

Flexibility includes flexibility in response to the extent provides for selective responses to the extent.

Possible with due consideration to the degree of

O.P.T. and reliability of the committed forces.

126 (2) The US and its Allies now have an overall military superiority against which all courses of action must ultimately be weighed. This strength is the source of our greater latitude of action in the conduct of war on a world-wide basis even though we do not match the S-S Bloc in all respects. Recognizing that success in warfare is so much a function of such intangible factors as will, psychological considerations and the like, the decision making process must not be unduly influenced by mere statistical ^{tabular} evaluations.

6 (1) (above). The

Planning will take into account.

B. 2. The over-all military effectiveness will be enhanced by making it clear in all actions that our nuclear power is available for use at any time and that we have the will to use the power as required.

C. GW ops will be conducted on a scale, and in a manner which reflects that the US has the will to accept the consequences of general war. [See Annex C]. Operations will be conducted in such a manner as to afford us the maximum opportunity to take the initiative in using our power, but nuclear and nonnuclear.

d. US operations against the USSR may be conducted at a scale less than GW in order to:

1) Achieve those US objectives attainable short of GW.

2) Ensure the enemy to reconsider his course of action.

3) Afford an opportunity for the enemy to suspend military operations.

4) Establish the basis for political negotiations.

5) Place the US in a better position to implement SW plans.